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The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act
(PIPEDA)1 creates a consent-based regime for the collection, use and disclosure of
personal information. It also creates a number of exceptions to the general require-
ment of consent. One of these is for publicly available information. This term is
given a specific and limited definition in the Regulations Specifying Publicly Avail-
able Information.2 Although the categories of publicly available information set out
in the Regulations have been strictly limited, a recent Alberta Court of Appeal deci-
sion that is on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada3 has generated discussion
about whether information in public view should be added to the list of information
that qualifies as “publicly available information.” If this question can be posed
about information in real space, it can also be asked about information posted
online.
The rationale for the exception for publicly available information lies in the
fact that such information is of a kind or quality such that either the individual’s
consent to make it public can be presumed, or its publication is mandated by law in
order to serve specific public purposes. Collection, use and disclosure of this infor-
mation in a manner consistent with these purposes requires no further consent. The
core issue to be considered in this article is whether PIPEDA’s Regulations should
be amended to include information in public view. Although the focus is on
PIPEDA, reference will also be made to equivalent provisions in the private sector
data protection statutes of Alberta4 and British Columbia,5 both of which have been
* Canada Research Chair in Information Law and Professor, University of Ottawa,
Faculty of Law, Common Law Section. This paper is based on a report commissioned
by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC). The views expressed in
this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the
OPC.
1 SC 2000, c 5. PIPEDA governs the collection, use and disclosure of personal informa-
tion by private sector actors. It applies to federal works, undertakings and businesses
across Canada, and to organizations that carry out their commercial activities inter-
provincially or internationally. It also applies to intra-provincial commercial activities
in any province that has not enacted substantially similar legislation.
2 Regulations Specifying Publicly Available Information, SOR/2001-7 [Regulations].
3 UFCW-Can, Local 401 v. Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2012
ABCA 130 (Alta. C.A.); additional reasons 2012 CarswellAlta 1393 (Alta. C.A.); leave
to appeal allowed 2012 CarswellAlta 1769 (S.C.C.).
4 Personal Information Protection Act, SA. 2003, c P-6.5 [PIPA (Alberta)].
5 Personal Information Protection Act, SBC 2003, c 63 [PIPA (BC)].
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declared substantially similar to PIPEDA.6 It is Alberta’s exception for publicly
available information that will be considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in
2013.
This article begins with a review of the structure of PIPEDA in order to situate
the exception within its statutory context. This is followed by a detailed considera-
tion of the exception for publicly available information. The article then offers a
discussion of whether the scope of this exception should be expanded, and offers an
alternative.
I. THE STRUCTURE OF PIPEDA
Broadly speaking, section 4 of PIPEDA provides that it applies to “organiza-
tions,”7 and to the “personal information”8 that they collect, use or disclose in the
course of “commercial activities.”9 Each of the terms in quotation marks is separ-
ately defined in the legislation. Each is also expansively defined, giving PIPEDA a
broad application to private sector actors in their collection, use and disclosure of
personal information. PIPEDA also applies to the personal information that “is
about an employee of the organization and that the organization collects, uses or
discloses in connection with the operation of a federal work, undertaking or
business.”10
In spite of its broad scope, certain activities are excluded from the application
of PIPEDA. For example, to avoid conflict with the Privacy Act,11 the application
of PIPEDA to the federal public sector is expressly excluded.12 PIPEDA also does
not apply to “any individual in respect of personal information that the individual
collects, uses or discloses for personal or domestic purposes and does not collect,
6 Quebec’s An Act respecting the protection of personal information in the private sector
(QC), RSQ c. P-39.1 [PPIPS], was deemed substantially similar in: Organizations in
the Province of Quebec Exemption Order, SOR/2003-374, 19 November, 2003. Note
that this statute predates PIPEDA. PIPA (Alberta), supra note 4, was declared substan-
tially similar by: Organizations in the Province of Alberta Exemption Order,
SOR/2004-219, 12 October 2004. PIPA (BC), supra note 5, was declared substantially
similar by: Organizations in the Province of British Columbia Exemption Order,
SOR/2004-220, 12 October 2004. Ontario’s Personal Health Information Protection
Act, SO 2004, c 3, Sch A has also been found to be substantially similar to PIPEDA,
but it is applicable only to personal health information in Ontario.
7 An organization is defined as: “an association, a partnership, a person and a trade
union.” (PIPEDA, supra note 1, s. 2).
8 “Personal information” is defined as “information about an identifiable individual, but
does not include the name, title or business address or telephone number of an em-
ployee of an organization.” PIPEDA, ibid.
9 PIPEDA, ibid., s. 4(1)(a). “Commercial activity” is defined as “any particular transac-
tion, act or conduct or any regular course of conduct that is of a commercial character,
including the selling, bartering or leasing of donor, membership or other fundraising
lists.” PIPEDA, ibid.
10 PIPEDA, ibid., s. 4(1)(b).
11 RSC 1985, c. P-21.
12 PIPEDA, ibid., s. 4(2)(a).
PRIVACY AND PUBLICLY AVAILABLE PERSONAL INFORMATION   3
use or disclose for any other purpose.”13 In a sense, this exclusion merely rein-
forces that PIPEDA only applies to the collection, use or disclosure of personal
information in the course of commercial activities. Purely personal or domestic ac-
tivities fall outside its scope. The application of the Act is also expressly excluded
in the case of “any organization in respect of personal information that the organi-
zation collects, uses or discloses for journalistic, artistic or literary purposes and
does not collect, use or disclose for any other purpose.”14 This exception is no
doubt intended to balance the privacy rights of individuals in their personal infor-
mation with freedom of expression values.15
Apart from these exceptions, the normative provisions of PIPEDA receive
broad application to the collection, use or disclosure of personal information by
private sector actors in the course of commercial activities. The core normative
provisions of PIPEDA are found in Schedule I, which reproduces the CSA Model
Code for the Protection of Personal Information on which the data protection norms
in PIPEDA are based.16 Sections 5 through 10 of PIPEDA either supplement or
modify the norms set out in Schedule I.
The cornerstone principle of PIPEDA is consent. Consent is addressed in prin-
ciple 4.3 of Schedule I, as well as in section 7 of the Act. Principle 4.3 of Schedule
I of PIPEDA provides that “[t]he knowledge and consent of the individual are re-
quired for the collection, use, or disclosure of personal information, except where
inappropriate.” Individuals must be informed of the purposes for which their infor-
mation will be used or disclosed.17 The form of consent provided may vary accord-
ing to the circumstances and the type of information. Generally, the more sensitive
information is considered to be, the more stringent will be the consent
requirements.18
Section 7 of PIPEDA contains a series of exceptions to the requirement of
consent. Subsection 7(1) creates exceptions to the consent requirement for the col-
lection of personal information; subsection 7(2) creates exceptions for consent to
use, and subsection 7(3) creates exceptions to the requirement of consent for disclo-
13 PIPEDA, ibid., s. 4(2)(b).
14 PIPEDA, ibid., s. 4(2)(c).
15 See Teresa Scassa, “Journalistic Purposes and Private Sector Data Protection Legisla-
tion: Blogs, Tweets, and Information Maps” (2010) 35 Queen’s Law J 733. This article
criticizes the way in which this exception is formulated. By excluding the application
of PIPEDA, supra note 1, from information collected, used or disclosed for the stated
purposes, all possible oversight of the way in which this personal information is dealt
with (including the reasonableness of the purposes) is precluded. Note that the journal-
ism exception is also at issue in United Foods, supra note 3.
16 In fact, Schedule I of PIPEDA, supra note 1, reproduces, in its entirety, the CSA Model
Code. For a discussion of how the CSA Code came to be incorporated within PIPEDA,
see: Stephanie Perrin, Heather H Black, David H Flaherty & T Murray Rankin, The
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act: An Annotated Guide,
(Irwin Law, 2001), pp 13–15.
17 PIPEDA, supra note 1, Schedule I, Clause 4.3.2.
18 PIPEDA, ibid., Schedule I, Clause 4.3.6. See, e.g., Randall v. Nubodys Fitness Centres,
2010 FC 681 (F.C.), at paras. 41–43; Englander v. Telus Communications Inc., 2004
FCA 387 (F.C.A.), at para. 60 [Englander].
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sure of personal information. In each of these subsections, there is an exception to
the requirement of consent where the personal information is “publicly available
information” within the meaning of the regulations. This is not an exception to the
application of PIPEDA; it is merely an exception to the requirement of consent.
The other normative provisions of PIPEDA — such as, for example, the obligation
to safeguard personal information — will still apply to publicly available informa-
tion that is collected, used or disclosed in the course of commercial activity.
(a) The Definition of Personal Information
Data protection legislation in Canada, whether in the private or public sectors,
tends to share a common core definition of “personal information.” While different
statutes vary in terms of whether they enumerate the types of information included
within the primary definition, most data protection statutes define personal infor-
mation as “information about an identifiable individual.”19 This shared definition
of “personal information” is important. It has led to the development of a general
approach across Canada which is relatively consistent. Given the array of data pro-
tection statutes across public and private sectors, and across federal and provincial
jurisdictions, and the challenges this poses for compliance, it is helpful to have
some common consensus around key terms and principles.
Under PIPEDA, the definition of personal information is not limited to infor-
mation recorded or stored in any particular format or medium. “Personal informa-
tion” has been found to include medical or biological data,20 biometric data,21 the
sound of one’s voice,22 photographic or video images,23 data,24 or other written
information. The crucial point is that the information must be about an identifiable
individual. The individual need not be directly identified by the information; it is
enough if the individual can be identified by matching the information with infor-
mation available from other sources.25 Thus, for example, other data about the In-
19 PIPEDA, supra note 1, s. 2. The Privacy Act, supra note 11, s. 3, defines “personal
information” as “information about an identifiable individual that is recorded in any
form,” and then provides a list of types of information that are included within the
definition. Both PIPA (BC), supra note 5, s. 1, and PIPA (Alberta), supra note 4, s. 1,
have definitions of “personal information” that are similar to that in PIPEDA. The
comparable Quebec legislation, supra note 6, uses slightly different wording, and pro-
vides, in s. 2, that “Personal information is any information which relates to a natural
person and allows that person to be identified.”
20 Rousseau v. Wyndowe, 2006 FC 1312 (F.C.); varied on different grounds in 2008 FCA
39 (F.C.A.).
21 Yeager v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 113 (F.C.). See
also Privacy Act, supra note 11, s. 3.
22 Wansink v. Telus Communications Inc, 2007 FCA 21.
23 Eastmond v. Canadian Pacific Railway, 2004 FC 852.
24 Gordon v. Canada (Minister of Health), 2008 FC 258.
25 Gordon, ibid. See also: Teresa Scassa, “Geographic Information as Personal Informa-
tion”, (2010) 10:2 Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 185.
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ternet-based activities of individuals — including that collected by cookies — is
personal information if it can be linked to an identifiable individual.26
The definition of “personal information” in PIPEDA has been described as
“very far reaching.”27 Indeed, given the structure and objectives of data protection
statutes, it has not made sense to limit the definition of personal information.28
Specific limitations required in particular contexts are introduced in the form of
limits on the application of the legislation or as exceptions to requirements for con-
sent to collection, use or disclosure, as is the case with publicly available
information.
(b) Personal Information v. Private Information
“Personal information” is not synonymous with “private information.” Thus
publicly available information is not disqualified from being personal information
simply by virtue of the fact that it is public.29 Controversially, in Leon’s Furniture
Limited v. Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner),30 the majority of the
Alberta Court of Appeal ruled that a driver’s licence plate number was not personal
information. In reaching that decision, they stated: “It is also contrary to common
sense to hold that a vehicle licence number is in any respect private.”31 Yet whether
the number is on display or not is clearly irrelevant to the issue of whether the
number is personal information. Indeed, if public information were automatically
disqualified from being personal information, there would be no need for the statu-
tory exception for publicly available information. In its subsequent decision in
United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 401 v. Alberta (Attorney General),32
the Alberta Court of Appeal noted that under the province’s Personal Information
26 PIPEDA Case Summary #2003-162, “Customer complains about airline’s use of
“cookies” on its Web site”, <http://www.priv.gc.ca/cf-dc/2003/cf-
dc_030416_7_e.cfm>. See also: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Re-
port on the 2010 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada’s Consultations on
Online Tracking, Profiling and Targeting and Cloud Computing, May 2011,
<http://www.priv.gc.ca/resource/consultations/report_201105_e.pdf>, at 24 [Online
Tracking].
27 Johnson v. Bell Canada, [2008] F.C.J. No. 1368, 2008 FC 1086 at para. 30. For a
detailed discussion of the meaning of “personal information”, see Scassa, supra note
25.
28 Lisa M. Austin, “Reviewing PIPEDA: Control, Privacy and the Limits of Fair Informa-
tion Practices”, (2006-2007) 44 Can. Bus LJ 21 at 52, also argues for a broad interpre-
tation of “personal information”.
29 See, e.g.: Re Synergen Housing Co-op Ltd., Order No. P2010-003, Alberta OIPC,
<http://www.oipc.ab.ca/downloads/documentloader.ashx?id=2636>.
30 Leon’s Furniture Ltd. v. Alberta (Information & Privacy Commissioner), 2011 ABCA
94; leave to appeal refused 2011 CarswellAlta 1938 (S.C.C.) [Leon’s Furniture].
31 Ibid. at para. 50. Conrad J, in her dissenting opinion, at paras. 112-113, makes this
distinction between the private sphere protected by the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy, and the broader goals of data protection legislation.
32 Supra note 3.
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Protection Act (PIPA(Alberta)),33 “‘personal’ information is not the same as ‘pri-
vate’ information.”34
The distinction between personal information and private information is linked
to the purpose of data protection legislation, which, in the case of PIPEDA, is set
out in section 3: 
3. The purpose of this Part is to establish, in an era in which technology
increasingly facilitates the circulation and exchange of information, rules to
govern the collection, use and disclosure of personal information in a man-
ner that recognizes the right of privacy of individuals with respect to their
personal information and the need of organizations to collect, use or dis-
close personal information for purposes that a reasonable person would con-
sider appropriate in the circumstances.
The statute is aimed at providing a regime to govern the manner in which organiza-
tions collect, use or disclose the personal information of individuals in the course of
commercial activity, in a manner that is respectful of the privacy rights of individu-
als. This applies to all information. PIPEDA gives individuals a measure of control,
through the central concept of consent, over their personal information. The statute
has numerous provisions which override the principle of consent in specific cir-
cumstances, where other interests, both public and private, outweigh the right of the
individual to control uses of their information.35
By contrast, a right to privacy, such as that protected by section 8 of the Char-
ter,36 defines certain spheres related to the individual (their person, their home, and
their “core biographical information”)37 into which the state may not intrude, un-
less that intrusion can be justified as a reasonable limit on the privacy right that is
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.38 Statutory torts of inva-
sion of privacy offer individuals recourse against anyone (whether a state actor or a
private actor) who intentionally invades their privacy. In both the Charter and the
tort contexts, the issue is whether the individual’s sphere of privacy is invaded, and
in both contexts the analysis may include a consideration of whether the individual
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances.39 Whether informa-
33 Supra note 4.
34 United Food, supra note 3 at para. 10.
35 Exceptions to the rule of consent to collection of information are found in s. 7(1) of
PIPEDA, supra note 1. Exceptions to consent for use are found in s. 7(2), and excep-
tions to consent for disclosure are in s. 7(3).
36 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11, s. 8 [Charter].
37 This framework is described and discussed, for example, in: R. v. Tessling, 2004 SCC
67, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, at paras. 19–24.
38 Charter, supra note 36, s. 1.
39 In the Charter context, see, for example, the discussion of the reasonable expectation
of privacy in R. v. Tessling, supra note 37, at paras. 19–24. The principle is also evi-
dent in tort cases. See the discussion in: Elizabeth Paton-Simpson, “Privacy and the
Reasonable Paranoid: The Protection of Privacy in Public Places”, (2000) 50 U of T LJ
305, and Teresa Scassa, “Information Privacy in Public Space: Location Data, Data
Protection and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy”, (2009) 7:2 CJLT 193.
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tion or activities are made public or kept private is therefore often relevant in these
contexts. For example, Canadian courts dealing with tort claims and in criminal
cases have held that there is little or no expectation of privacy in activities that take
place in public,40 although other courts have added some nuance to this view.41
This notion of “reasonable expectation of privacy” is relevant in tort and
Charter contexts because there is no violation of privacy rights if the individual had
no reasonable expectation that their activities would be private. In United Food, the
Alberta Court of Appeal was critical of the fact that the private sector data protec-
tion legislation did not create a broad exception for information “that is personal,
but not at all private.”42 Without citing any examples, the Court stated that “the
comparative statutes in some provinces exempt activity that occurs in some public
places.”43 Yet the only other provinces with private sector data protection statutes
are BC and Quebec, and neither statute contains such an exception. The court is
most likely referring to the statutes which, in some provinces, create torts of inva-
sion of privacy, and which set certain contextual boundaries for the torts.44 This
type of legislation is not at all equivalent. It may be appropriate that an individual’s
ability to allege a tortious invasion of their privacy be considered in light of cir-
cumstances that include whether they were engaged in activity in a public place.
However, such considerations are not relevant in the data protection context, where
the issue is not whether individuals have an expectation of privacy in their personal
information; rather, the issue is one of their ability to control how and when their
personal information is collected, used or disclosed.45 Data protection laws essen-
40 See, for example, Druken v. R.G. Fewer & Associates Inc., [1998] N.J. No. 312, 1998
CarswellNfld 289 (T.D.), at para. 43. See also: R. v. Shortreed (1990), 54 C.C.C. (3d)
292 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Dilling (1993), 84 C.C.C. (3d) 325 (B.C. C.A.); leave to appeal
refused (1994), 88 C.C.C. (3d) vi (note) (S.C.C.); R. v. Hounsell, [1994] N.J. No. 319,
1994 CarswellNfld 343 (Prov. Ct.); R. v. Abbey, 2006 CarswellOnt 7381, [2006] O.J.
No. 4689 (S.C.J.).
41 For example, in Tremblay c. Compagnie d’assurances Standard Life the Quebec Court
of Appeal affirmed the trial judge’s finding that while in general there might be no
reasonable expectation of privacy in activities carried out in public, the nature and du-
ration of surveillance activities may be such that an individual’s privacy rights are vio-
lated because of the cumulative effect of monitoring of daily activities. At trial,
Soldevila J. observed : « une personne demeure dans le cadre de sa vie privée
lorsqu’elle est sur sa propriété, circule dans la rue et vaque à ses occupations habituel-
les, même si elle le fait à la vue de tous. Elle conserve donc en tout temps le droit de ne
pas être observée et suivie systématiquement. » Tremblay c. Cie d’assurances Standard
Life, [2008] J.Q. No. 5252, 2008 QCCS 2488 at para 59, ; affirmed 2010 CarswellQue
4440 (C.A.); varied 2010 QCCA 933 at para. 96.
42 United Food, supra note 3 at para. 77.
43 Ibid. at para. 73.
44 See, for example, Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c. 373 (British Columbia); The Privacy
Act, RSM 1987, c. P125 (Manitoba); The Privacy Act, RSS 1978, c. P-24 (Saskatche-
wan); Privacy Act, RSN 1990, c. P-22 (Newfoundland and Labrador); Civil Code of
Québec, SQ 1991, c. 64, arts 35–41.
45 See, e.g., the dissenting opinion of Conrad J. in Leon’s Furniture, supra note 30 at
paras. 111-112.
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tially set a code of conduct for organizations engaged in commercial activities, and
they set boundaries as to how personal information may be exploited in these con-
texts. In such circumstances, whether the information is “public” or “private” is
irrelevant to whether information is personal information governed by the data pro-
tection statute.46 There is no obvious reason why an exception to the law should be
created so as to permit companies to cull personal information about individuals
from multiple sources regarding their movements in public spaces without their
consent. It is important to note that video surveillance cameras and cell phone loca-
tion information could both constitute this kind of information.
II. PUBLICLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION
Certain categories of information known as “publicly available information”
are the subject of exceptions to the rules of consent under section 7 of PIPEDA.47
These categories are identified in the Regulations Specifying Publicly Available In-
formation.48 The way in which these exceptions are structured means that “publicly
available information” may still be considered personal information.49 However,
consent is not required for its collection, use or disclosure in certain prescribed
circumstances. The application of the other data protection norms is not precluded
by the fact that personal information is also publicly available information. Thus an
organization that collects, uses and discloses publicly available information would
still be required to comply with the norms regarding access, or the safeguarding of
personal information. In Case Summary #2009-004,50 for example, the Assistant
Privacy Commissioner recommended that the respondent organization modify its
website to specify that it collects publicly available information in order to satisfy
the openness requirement of PIPEDA.
46 It may, however, be relevant to determining the degree of sensitivity of the informa-
tion. See, e.g., Re K.E. Gostlin Enterprises, Order P05-01, OIPC BC,
<http://www.oipc.bc.ca/PIPAOrders/2005/OrderP05-01.pdf> at para. 58. The confla-
tion of “reasonable expectation of privacy” principles with private sector data protec-
tion legislation is evident in the decision at first instance in UFCW-Can, Local 401 v.
Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2011 ABQB 415; varied 2012
CarswellAlta 760 (C.A.); additional reasons 2012 CarswellAlta 1393 (C.A.); leave to
appeal allowed 2012 CarswellAlta 1769 (S.C.C.). There, the judge found that “[t]here
is no rational connection between protecting privacy when the individuals in question
are in public view. There is no right to ‘practical anonymity’” (at para. 155). The fail-
ure to find a rational connection between regulating the capturing of information in
public view and data protection is a failure to understand the goals and structure of the
legislation.
47 These are found in PIPEDA, supra note 1, at paras. 7(1)(d), 7(2)(c.1), and 7(3)(h.1).
48 Regulations, supra note 2.
49 For example, in PIPEDA Case Summary #2009-004, No Consent Required for Using
Publicly Available Personal Information Matched with Geographically Specific Demo-
graphic Statistics, [2009] CPCSF No. 4, <http://www.priv.gc.ca/cf-
dc/2009/2009_004_0109_e.cfm>, the Assistant Privacy Commissioner refers to “pub-
licly available personal information” in contrast to “personal information subject to
consent requirements.”
50 PIPEDA Case Summary #2009-004, ibid.
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Publicly available information also remains subject to section 5(3) of PIPEDA
which provides that “[a]n organization may collect, use or disclose personal infor-
mation only for purposes that a reasonable person would consider are appropriate
in the circumstances.”51 In Case Summary #2009-015, the Assistant Privacy Com-
missioner stated that section 5(3) applied to the exceptions to consent in section 7
of PIPEDA, including those relating to publicly available information.52 This
means that any collection, use or disclosure of publicly available information is
only exempted from the consent requirements where the collection, use or disclo-
sure is for a purpose that a reasonable person would consider appropriate in the
circumstances.
The categories of “publicly available information” are created to address per-
sonal information that is made publicly available in certain contexts and for certain
purposes.53 PIPEDA and the equivalent statutes in Alberta and BC recognize that
where certain information has been made publicly available, it would not make
sense to require additional consent to permit its collection, use or disclosure for
those purposes. In other words, “this information should continue to be accessible
to an organization for its primary purpose without the need to obtain the indivi-
dual’s consent.”54 However, if the information is used for purposes other than those
for which it was made public, “the use of the information for secondary purposes
should be subject to the same fair information principles that apply to other types of
personal information.”55 It is also important to note that the exception only applies
to information gathered from publicly available sources. If the same information is
collected from a different source, the information is not considered “publicly avail-
able” and there is no exception to the requirement of consent.56
To qualify as publicly available, information must be available to the public
without limitation or restriction.57 Information that is only available for a fee is not
publicly available information. Each of the categories of publicly available infor-
mation identified in the regulation shares this feature. In the case of information
appearing in magazines and newspapers, there is generally free access through pub-
51 PIPEDA, supra note 1, s. 5(3). Emphasis added.
52 PIPEDA Case Summary #2009-015, Individual’s creditor leaves legal debt-recovery
document at his workplace, [2009] CPCSF No 15, at para. 11,
<http://www.priv.gc.ca/cf-dc/2009/2009_015_0316_e.cfm>.
53 For example, the PIPA Information Sheet states: “By defining the categories of per-
sonal information that is publicly available information, the Act makes it clear that not
all personal information in the public domain can be considered publicly available in-
formation under PIPA.” (Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Al-
berta, “Publicly Available Information”, Personal Information Protection Act, Infor-
mation Sheet 9, September 2006; Revised May 2010,
<http://servicealberta.ca/pipa/documents/InfoSheet9.pdf>, at 1 [PIPA Information
Sheet].
54 PIPA Information Sheet, ibid. at 1.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid. at 2. See also Citi Cards Canada Inc. v. Pleasance, 2010 ONSC 1124, [2010] O.J.
No. 1175, at para. 26, ; affirmed 2011 ONCA 3, [2011] O.J. No. 15.
57 PIPA Information Sheet, supra note 53 at 2.
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lic libraries. Information will also still be considered to be publicly available even
where it is only accessible from one location. An example might be a public regis-
try that must be consulted at a particular government office. The main condition is
that information must be openly available to the public for consultation. By con-
trast, information that is available only to those who subscribe to a service or who
meet eligibility requirements is not publicly available information.
(a) Publicly Available Information in Substantially Similar Legislation
As noted above, both PIPA (Alberta) and PIPA (BC) share a similar approach
to PIPEDA with respect to publicly available information. Each of these statutes
creates an exception to the requirement of consent for the collection, use or disclo-
sure of personal information where it is available to the public from a source that is
recognized in regulations enacted pursuant to the statute. In each of these provincial
statutes, the regulations establish a closed list of categories of publicly available
information58 that are essentially the same as those in PIPEDA’s Regulations Spec-
ifying Publicly Available Information. In Alberta, the equivalent regulations have
come under challenge in United Food, where the Alberta Court of Appeal objected
to what it called the “artificially narrow” definition of publicly available
information.59
In Quebec, section 1 of the Act respecting the Protection of Personal Informa-
tion in the Private Sector provides that it does not apply to “information which by
law is public.”60 This must be understood with reference to section 57 of the Act
respecting Access to documents held by public bodies and the protection of per-
sonal information61 which sets out that information which can be considered by
law to be public. This information consists of categories of information in the
hands of public bodies. While PIPEDA and the PIPA statutes of Alberta and BC
include certain government information (such as registry information and court and
tribunal information) in the definition of “publicly available information,” their cat-
egories of “publicly available information” include more than just public sector in-
formation. Thus, the Quebec legislation does not exclude from its application infor-
mation in telephone directories, business or professional directories, or print or
electronic publications that are available to the public.
(b) The Definition of Publicly Available Information
An exception to the rules of consent for the collection, use and disclosure of
personal information under paragraphs 7(1)(d), (2)(c.1) and (3)(h.1) of PIPEDA is
available where the personal information “is publicly available and is specified by
58 In Alberta, see: Personal Information Protection Act Regulation, Alberta Regulation
366/2003, s. 7. In BC, see Personal Information Protection Act Regulations, BC Regu-
lation 473/2003, s. 6.
59 Supra note 3 at para. 77.
60 PPIPS, supra note 6, s. 1.
61 RSQ chapter A-2.1
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the regulations.”62 The Regulations Specifying Publicly Available Information63
create a closed list of five categories of “information and classes of information.”64
Each of these is considered in turn below.
(i) Telephone Directory Information
Paragraph 1(a) of the Regulations characterizes as publicly available informa-
tion: 
(a) personal information consisting of the name, address and telephone
number of a subscriber that appears in a telephone directory that is available
to the public, where the subscriber can refuse to have the personal informa-
tion appear in the directory;
In order to qualify as publicly available information, the directory must relate to
telephone services, it must be publicly available (and not a private or in-house di-
rectory),65 and subscribers must have the option to decline to have their informa-
tion included.66 The regulation is crafted so as to include most standard telephone
directories, but not to go beyond this type of directory. In Case Summary #2009-
04, the Assistant Privacy Commissioner found that a company that took telephone
directory information and filtered it using Statistics Canada anonymized ge-
odemographic information for particular neighbourhoods, did not collect, use or
disclose personal information without consent, as the directory information was
publicly available, and the correlated geodemographic information was not per-
sonal information.67
It is interesting to note that in Case Summary #2009-004, although the regula-
tions did not explicitly place a limit on the purposes to which directory information
could be put, the Assistant Privacy Commissioner applied the general restriction
found in section 5(3) of PIPEDA, which limits the collection, use and disclosure of
personal information to purposes which a reasonable person would consider appro-
priate in the circumstances. The Assistant Privacy Commissioner noted in this case
that “in making telephone directory information publicly available, Parliament rec-
62 PIPEDA, supra note 1, at paras. 7(1)(d), 7(2)(c.1), and 7(3)(h.1).
63 Regulations, supra note 2.
64 PIPEDA, supra note 1, s. 26(1)(a.1).
65 According to the PIPA Information Sheet, information must be “publicly available” to
qualify for this exception. “Publicly available” means “that any member of the public
must be able to have access to the information. There can be no restrictions on who
may have access to the information.” Thus information only available to members or
subscribers of a service would not qualify. PIPA Information Sheet, supra note 53 at 2.
The Information Sheet also provides that the availability to the public must be regular,
and not ad hoc or on a case by case basis.
66 Englander, supra note 18 at paras. 54-55.
67 Case Summary #2009-004, supra note 52 at para. 42. She found that the process used
by the direct marketing company “does not change the status of the White Pages infor-
mation from publicly available personal information to personal information subject to
consent requirements.” (at para. 42).
12   CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [11 C.J.L.T.]
ognized that it could and would be used for commercial marketing purposes.”68
Thus it was a use that fell within the parameters of section 5(3).69
In Englander v. Telus,70 the Federal Court of Appeal ruled that paragraph 1(a)
of the Regulations Specifying Publicly Available Information applied where 
. . . personal information consisting of the name, address and telephone
number of a subscriber already appears in a publicly available telephone
directory. They enable organizations to collect, use or disclose that existing
information for their own purposes. But the provisions do not, and indeed
cannot, apply to the very organization that initially collects the information
for the purpose of publishing a telephone directory that will, once published,
become publicly available.71
Thus an organization in the business of compiling such a directory (as opposed to
using one already available) must still comply with PIPEDA’s norms regarding
consent.
Both Alberta and BC contain largely similar provisions with respect to tele-
phone directory information.
(ii) Professional or Business Directories
Paragraph 1(b) of the Regulations characterizes as publicly available informa-
tion: 
(b) personal information including the name, title, address and telephone
number of an individual that appears in a professional or business directory,
listing or notice, that is available to the public, where the collection, use and
disclosure of the personal information relate directly to the purpose for
which the information appears in the directory, listing or notice;
The exception for publicly available information in professional or other directories
removes the need for consent where the collection, use or disclosure of the personal
information “relates directly to the purpose for which the information appears in
the directory, listing or notice.”72 While such purposes might be limited to contact-
ing the named individuals for business-related reasons, they could potentially be
broader. In Case Summary #2005-297,73 however, the Assistant Privacy Commis-
sioner found that a university published faculty email addresses on its web site in
order to permit faculty members to be contacted for reasons that furthered the uni-
versity’s interests. In consequence, it was not consistent with these purposes for an
organization to use this information to market season tickets for a sports team. The
68 Ibid.
69 The same requirement of collection, use and disclosure for “reasonable purposes” in
the case of PIPA (Alberta) is referenced in PIPA Information Sheet, supra note 53 at 3.
70 Englander, supra note 18.
71 Ibid. at para. 54.
72 The PIPA Information Sheet, supra note 53 at 3 states that “[r]elates directly to” means
that the collection, use or disclosure “must have a reasonable and direct connection to
that purpose.” [Emphasis in original.]
73 Case Summary #2005-297, Unsolicited email for marketing purposes, online:
<http://www.priv.gc.ca/cf-dc/2005/297_050331_01_e.cfm>.
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use therefore fell outside the scope of the exception for publicly available
information.
The exception is broad enough to include electronic and online directories.74
This raises an interesting question about whether a social networking site such as
LinkedIn75 might be considered to be a “professional or business directory” within
the meaning of the Regulations. If it were to be so considered, then the consent
norm would not apply to the collection, use or disclosure of “personal information”
for the purpose for which it is included on the site. Not only is the nature and
amount of personal information on LinkedIn much more extensive than that in
traditional professional or business directories (LinkedIn subscribers often provide
a considerable amount and variety of personal information), it might be quite chal-
lenging to clearly identify the range of purposes for which individuals have sup-
plied this information (to stay in touch with friends/business contacts, to showcase
their achievements, to solicit business, etc.). This would make it extremely difficult
to determine the parameters of the exception, as the purposes for which information
is made available on the site will vary from individual to individual. In addition, it
should be noted that section 5(3) of PIPEDA would limit the purposes for which
information is collected, used or disclosed to ones which a reasonable person would
consider reasonable in the circumstances. There would be some purposes which
would fall outside the reach of this clause — such as, for example, targeted market-
ing of products unrelated to the individual’s business or profession.
It is important to note, however, that the exception in the Regulations is for
professional or business directory information that is publicly available. The con-
tents of LinkedIn are not genuinely publicly available. While small amounts of
LinkedIn information are available from a general online search, full details are
only available to members of the site. In order to become a member, it is necessary
to create an account by providing personal information to the social networking
site.
Both PIPA (BC) and PIPA (Alberta) include professional or business directory
information in their categories of publicly available information. As is the case with
the PIPEDA Regulations, Alberta explicitly limits the collection, use and disclosure
of this information without consent to the purposes for which it appears in the di-
rectory. The BC regulation does not contain this express limitation. However, it
provides that such directory information is not eligible for the exception unless “the
individual is permitted to refuse to have his or her personal information included in
the directory.”76
74 For example, in Case Summary #2005-297, ibid., the Assistant Privacy Commissioner
of Canada considered that a university’s online faculty directory fell within the scope
of the exception for professional or business directories.
75 LinkedIn, online: <http://www.linkedin.com>. Note that LinkedIn claims to have over
120 million professionals as members as of August 4, 2011. See online:
<http://press.linkedin.com/about>.
76 BC Personal Information Protection Act Regulations, supra note 58, s. 6(1)(b).
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(iii) Registry Information
Paragraph 1(c) addresses a category of publicly available information that has
government as its source. It refers to: 
(c) personal information that appears in a registry collected under a statutory
authority and to which a right of public access is authorized by law, where
the collection, use and disclosure of the personal information relate directly
to the purpose for which the information appears in the registry;
Thus, for example, the public information in a land titles registry would fall under
this exception. Such information could be collected, used and disclosed without
consent, so long as its use “relate[s] directly to the purpose for which the informa-
tion appears in the registry.”77 In one case, the Assistant Privacy Commissioner
found that any collection, use or disclosure under this exception must be for a pur-
pose that a reasonable person would consider reasonable in the circumstances, in
accordance with section 5(3) of PIPEDA.78 In the case of information that has been
made publicly available under statutory authority, it is likely that there will be some
reasonably clearly articulated purpose for which the information is made available,
and which can be used to place limits on how the information may be used without
the data subject’s consent. For example, in Case Summary #2009-020, the Assis-
tant Privacy Commissioner ruled that the purpose of the registry set up under the
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act79 was to further the purpose of that statute, which
was, in part, “to establish a way for creditors to establish their claims and be re-
paid.”80 The use of the information for other purposes would not fall within the
exception.81
Both PIPA (BC) and PIPA (Alberta) provide for an exception for registry in-
formation in their regulations governing publicly available information. In Alberta,
77 PIPEDA Case Summary #2009-020, Publicly available information about individual’s
bankruptcy cannot be disclosed for debt-collection purposes without her consent,
[2009] C.P.C.S.F. No. 20, online: <http://www.priv.gc.ca/cf-
dc/2009/2009_020_1210_e.cfm>.
78 Ibid. In Alberta, see Alberta Motor Association Insurance Company Investigation Re-
port, P2008-IR-001, online:
<http://www.oipc.ab.ca/downloads/documentloader.ashx?id=2271>, where the Office
of the Information and Privacy Commissioner expressed the view that it was legal to
collect information about an individual’s bankruptcy from the Personal Property Regis-
try where the purpose for collection was an insurance fraud investigation.
79 RSC 1985, c. B-3.
80 PIPEDA Case Summary #2009-020, supra note 77 at para. 11.
81 In this case, the creditor disclosed information about the complainant’s bankruptcy to
her siblings in an attempt to recover the amount of the debt from them. The Assistant
Privacy Commissioner found that this fell outside the purposes for which the registry
was established. Note that in PIPEDA Case Summary #2009-021, Disclosure com-
plaint against bank deemed not well-founded because the information came from pub-
lic records, [2009] C.P.C.S.F. No. 21, online: <http://www.priv.gc.ca/cf-
dc/2009/2009_021_1223_e.cfm>, the Assistant Privacy Commissioner found that the
consent was not required for the collection and use by a debt collection agency of
information from a public land registry, because that information was publicly availa-
ble information. The information consisted of the fact that the complainant was the co-
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the limitation on the collection, use or disclosure of this information without con-
sent is only for the purpose for which the information appears in the registry, as is
the case under PIPEDA. However, the wording of the Alberta exception requires
that purpose to be “an established purpose of the registry,”82 suggesting that spe-
cific purposes must be found in the enabling legislation or in regulations or policy
documents relating to the registry.
(iv) Records of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Bodies
Paragraph 1(d) of the Regulations includes within the definition of publicly
available information personal information that is found in records or documents of
courts or tribunals: 
(d) personal information that appears in a record or document of a judicial
or quasi-judicial body, that is available to the public, where the collection,
use and disclosure of the personal information relate directly to the purpose
for which the information appears in the record or document;
The documents must be ones that are made available to the public, and the excep-
tion only applies where the information is used for a purpose that relates directly to
that which lies behind its inclusion in the record or document. In Case Summary
#2009-015, the Assistant Privacy Commissioner found that although a statement of
claim was a court record, access to such documents was not unlimited, as courts
retained discretion over the safeguarding of their own records, and had a right to
deny access to them for improper purposes. As such, although court records could
be consulted by the public, a plaintiff did not have “the unfettered right to distribute
the contents of a court file or pleadings to third parties outside the litigation.”83
Most court and tribunal decisions are publicly available as part of the open
courts principle, and a wide range of other documents related to the legal process
are available for consultation at court houses or at the offices of administrative
agencies. Increasingly, material of this kind is being made freely available online.
The OPC has expressed concerns in the past over the publication of administrative
tribunal decisions online, and the privacy implications this may have for individu-
als. Many of these implications go beyond the contexts addressed by PIPEDA.
PIPEDA applies to the collection, use or disclosure of personal information in the
owner of the residence that corresponded to the home address on her credit card ac-
count. The issue of the purposes of the registry was not specifically discussed.
82 PIPA (Alberta), supra note 4, s. 7(c). According to the Office of the Information and
Privacy Commissioner of Alberta, such purposes may be express — as set out in the
enabling legislation, for example — or implied in any government policy established
pursuant to an Act or regulation. (PIPA Information Sheet, supra note 53 at 4). Note
that the exception also refers to governmental and non-governmental registries. Non-
governmental registries may be operated by an organization or a local public body act-
ing under the authority of a provincial Act or regulation. (PIPA Information Sheet,
supra note 53 at 5).The BC Regulation refers to registries “to which the public has a
right of access.” (supra note 58, s. 6(1)(c)), so long as it is collected “under the author-
ity of an enactment, the laws of the government of Canada or a province or the bylaws
of a municipality or other similar local authority in Canada.”
83 PIPEDA Case Summary #2009-015, supra note 52.
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course of commercial activities, and some of the privacy concerns that relate to
administrative tribunal decisions stem from the potential for nosy neighbours, co-
workers, ex-spouses or even malefactors to browse electronic decisions for infor-
mation about individuals. These activities would not be captured by PIPEDA in any
event.
The fact that such information may be found online does not really change the
scope of the exception — the information would still be considered “publicly avail-
able” if members of the public had to go down to the courthouse to request access
to a file. Nevertheless, it does change the scale of activities in relation to such infor-
mation. It makes the personal information contained in these documents very easily
accessible and searchable, and very inexpensive to collect and compile. Nonethe-
less, as noted above, the exception is fairly limited; to qualify for the exception, the
purpose for which the information is collected, used or disclosed must be consistent
with the purpose for which the information appears on the record.84 It must also be
a purpose that a reasonable person would consider appropriate in the circum-
stances, as per section 5(3) of PIPEDA.
The limitation to purposes for which information appears on the record can be
difficult to apply in the case of court and tribunal records. Often there are multiple
purposes for which information is made public. In the judicial or administrative
tribunal context, for example, the information may be included to meet any one or
more of the following purposes: to provide an accurate record of proceedings; to
satisfy the open courts principle; for deterrent effect; to educate the public about an
agency mandate; or to provide transparency and accountability.85 In this respect,
there may be some tension between the purpose for which specific information ap-
pears on the record and the purpose for which records are kept generally. The Of-
fice of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada’s Guidance Document on Electronic
Disclosure of Personal Information in the Decisions of Administrative Tribunals
notes that many of the objectives of courts and tribunals in publishing their deci-
sions can be achieved without publishing all of the personal information contained
in the decisions.86 Recognizing the difficulty in identifying the purposes for which
the personal information is recorded under a similar exception in Alberta’s PIPA,
the Office of the Alberta Information and Privacy Commissioner advises that “[i]f
the purpose cannot be determined from information published by the body or spe-
cific statements in the record itself, an organization should determine whether a
reasonable person would consider the collection, use or disclosure of personal in-
formation appropriate in the circumstances.”87 No such exception is present under
PIPA (BC) — court and tribunal records do not constitute “publicly available infor-
84 For example, in PIPEDA Case Summary #2009-015, ibid., the Assistant Privacy Com-
missioner found that the disclosure of a statement of claim had to relate directly “to the
purpose of advancing a claim in a court of law.”
85 Some of these purposes are addressed in OPC Guidance Document, Electronic Disclo-
sure of Personal Information in the Decisions of Administrative Tribunals, February
2010, online: <http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/pub/gd_trib_201002_e.cfm> [Gui-
dance Document].
86 Guidance Document, ibid.
87 PIPA Information Sheet, supra note 53 at 6.
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mation” for the purposes of private sector data protection legislation in that
province.
(v) Published information
Paragraph 1(e) of the Regulations creates an exception to the consent provi-
sions for: 
(e) personal information that appears in a publication, including a magazine,
book or newspaper, in printed or electronic form, that is available to the
public, where the individual has provided the information.88
In order to qualify under this section, the information must be contained in a “pub-
lication,” whether in print or electronic form. A further limit on the exception is
that the individual data subject must be the person who provided the information to
the publication. Thus, a report on another person’s activities, or an unauthorized
biography, could not be considered to fit within the scope of this exception.89 It is
important to note that this exception is in many ways broader than the other excep-
tions because the scope of the collection, use or disclosure without consent is not
limited to the purposes for which the information was provided. Thus, so long as
the data subject provided the information to the publication, it may be collected,
used or disclosed, presumably for any purpose, subject to section 5(3), without the
data subject’s consent.
It is an open question whether information posted online by individuals,
whether in blogs, tweets or on social networking sites constitutes a “publication”
for the purposes of this exception. While the exception refers to publications in
“electronic” form, not all digital publications will be likely to be considered pub-
licly available. As noted in the earlier discussion of LinkedIn, most social network-
ing sites are not truly “public.” Only members — those who create accounts — are
given access to the information on the public pages of the site.
The sheer volume of information that may be posted on social networking
sites, on blogs or on personal websites by far exceeds the volume of material avail-
able through traditional publishing media. There is generally little or no mediation
of the content of what is posted online by individuals, and the vast majority of
those who post information will have little or no experience in publishing.90 They
may also be unaware of the legal consequences that might flow from the publica-
tion of their material. Further, the goals and objectives of those who post informa-
tion may vary enormously. While some may wish to communicate with the world
88 Regulations, supra note 2, s. 1.
89 In Re Brubaker, Order No P2008-010, [2010] A.I.P.C.D. No. 46, online
<http://www.oipc.ab.ca/downloads/documentloader.ashx?id=2662>, an adjudicator
under Alberta’s PIPA found that in a case where information had been gathered about
police officers’ conduct from multiple newspaper articles and letters to the editor, that
each letter or article would need to be reviewed separately in order to determine
whether the individual officers referred to in each item could be considered to have
provided that information. See also PIPA Information Sheet, supra note 53 at 6.
90 Note that the PIPA Information Sheet, ibid. at 6, cautions that not all print publications
are equally reliable and reputable, and warns organizations not to rely on the publicly
available provision “if there is any uncertainty as to the source of the information.”
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at large, others may chiefly be trying to share photographs within their family cir-
cle, or to share information with like-minded individuals. It is by no means clear
that the majority of those who post content on the internet consider themselves to
be communicating to a broad public rather than to limited or private audiences. A
recent report by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, suggests that in
some cases those who create and post content to social networking sites do so be-
cause of peer pressure.91 This calls into question whether individual posters of in-
formation intended to make the information publicly available in a broad sense.
Serious consideration must be given to whether any source that provides com-
pletely unmediated information should be considered a source of “publicly availa-
ble information”. PIPEDA and its norms can serve as an important protection for
the personal information of individuals. To remove the core of that protection in a
context where individuals are relatively vulnerable, and where there are no checks
and balances, seems problematic. In all other existing categories of publicly availa-
ble information such checks and balances exist, and there is typically an entity that
can be held accountable for improperly making information publicly available.92
Another difficulty with information posted on social networking sites, blogs or
other internet fora is that it is not always clear who has made the information avail-
able.93 For example, a party may post photographs that contain the personal infor-
mation of others without the knowledge or consent of those individuals. While this
kind of disclosure (for domestic or private purposes) is not caught by PIPEDA, the
collection, use and disclosure of the information contained in the photo (video or
text document) by an organization in the course of commercial activity without the
consent of the data subject(s) would fall outside the scope of the exception in para-
graph 1(e) of the Regulations in the case of third party information. This is because
this exception requires the data subject to be the source of the personal information
in the publication.
A further, and serious consideration, is that social networking sites are widely
used by minors. A recent study estimates that millions of Facebook users are under
the age of 13.94 In the U.S., where special legislation aims to protect children’s
online privacy, the FTC has acknowledged that the law is of little use in contexts
where children provide inaccurate information about their age in order to obtain
91 Online Tracking, supra note 26 at 17.
92 For example, in Englander, supra note 18, the telephone company was held responsi-
ble for not properly informing customers about their right to have their listing informa-
tion excluded from the telephone directory.
93 The Decima Research, Research Report: Focus Testing Privacy Issues and Potential
Risks of Social Networking Sites, 20 March 2009,
<http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/survey/2009/decima_2009_02_e.cfm> [Decima
Research] at 7, indicated that not only do many users post photographs to social
networking sites that include other individuals, but many also tag these photos so as to
identify the individuals in them.
94 Wailin Wong, “Millions of underage kids use Facebook, Consumer Reports says,” 10
May 2011, Chicago Tribune
<http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/breaking/chibrkbus-millions-of-kids-under-
age-13-use-facebook-consumer-reports-says-20110509,0,4123052.story>.
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access to otherwise restricted online services.95 Although Facebook accounts are in
theory only available to those over the age of 13, it is well known that this restric-
tion is easy to circumvent. Apart from these vulnerable users under the age of 13,
millions more will be between 13 and 18 years of age, and thus still minors. The
FTC notes concerns “that teens may not be fully aware of the consequences of what
they do,”96 with the result that “teens may voluntarily disclose more information
than they should.”97 These findings are supported by recent Canadian research
which found that the high risk behaviour of youth that is found in other contexts
may also extend to the internet.98 A report by the Office of the Privacy Commis-
sioner of Canada also notes that younger children using social networking sites
consider that the audience for their posted information is other children.99 The use
by third parties of information posted by teens on Facebook was identified in one
U.S. study as one of the main privacy risks of such sites.100 Any inclusion of social
networking site information in the category of “publicly available information”
would expose potentially vast quantities of personal information of minors to col-
lection, use or disclosure without consent.
Alberta and BC both include information in a publication as “publicly availa-
ble information.” Both provincial exceptions refer to print or electronic publica-
tions and both expressly include, but do not apparently limit, the exception to
magazines, books or newspapers. In Alberta, it must be “reasonable to assume that
the individual that the information is about provided that information.”101 No such
express limitation is found in the BC regulation.102
III. DISCUSSION
As noted above, “publicly available information,” as defined in the Regula-
tions Specifying Publicly Available Information, is exempt from the requirement of
consent for its collection, use or disclosure. However, the exception is narrowly
framed. It is available only where the information is collected, used or disclosed for
95 The legislation in question is the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15
U.S.C. §§6501-6506, P.L. 105-277. See the discussion in Federal Trade Commission,
Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: A Proposed Framework for
Businesses and Policy Makers, Preliminary FTC Staff Report, December 2010,
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf> [FTC Framework] at 16.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid. at 16.
98 Avner Levin, et al, “The Next Digital Divide: Online Social Network Privacy”, March
2008, online: <http://www.ryerson.ca/tedrogersschool/privacy/Ryerson_Privacy_ Insti-
tute_OSN_Report.pdf>, at 11 [Digital Divide].
99 Online Tracking, supra note 26 at 17. The report goes on to note that these children “do
not expect adults to be part of that public, even though they know that adults can see
the information.” (at 17).
100 Harvey Jones & José Hiram Soltren, “Facebook: Threats to Privacy”, 15 December
2005, online: <http://www.swiss.ai.mit.edu/6095/student-papers/fall05-papers/
facebook.pdf>.
101 Alberta Regulation, supra note 58, s. 7(e).
102 See BC Regulation, supra note 58, s. 6(1)(d).
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the purposes for which it was made publicly available, and any such collection, use
or disclosure must also be for purposes that a reasonable person would consider
appropriate in the circumstances. These limitations are important in protecting indi-
viduals against inappropriate and unanticipated uses of their personal information
by private sector organizations engaged in commercial activity.
With most of the categories of publicly available information, the purposes for
which the information was made publicly available are relatively easy to discern.
Telephone directory information is made available to provide contact information
for the individuals whose names are included in the listings. Business or profes-
sional directory information is made available for similar purposes. Public registry
information is made publicly available for purposes which are generally ascertaina-
ble from the enabling legislation or related policy documents. In the case of court
or tribunal decisions, a number of purposes may be identified, but these are all
public purposes, and would clearly not include profiling or marketing activities.
The final category — that of “published information” — is the most challenging.
Yet the examples of publications that are given in the section are newspapers,
magazines and books — the dissemination of information in these vehicles is typi-
cally meant to educate or inform the public and serves a broader public interest.103
In any event, the exception is only available where the individual is the immediate
source of the information. Thus an element of consent is built into this exception —
the individual must have consented to the original publication of the information.
Further, any collection, use or disclosure of the information must be for the pur-
poses for which it was published.
Expanding the scope of what is “publicly available information” to capture
such things as activity in public view seems to equate “public” information with
“publicly available” information. There is much information that is public, yet that
is not excluded from the consent requirements of data protection legislation. While
it is true that Charter cases and some tort cases draw distinctions between “private”
and “public” information, this has never been the case in the data protection con-
text. This is because the goal is to protect individuals from collection, use or disclo-
sure of their personal information without their consent by organizations engaged
in commercial activity. It generally does not matter if the information is “public” or
“private” — the individual still has a right of control over the commercial exploita-
tion of this information by others. Once broad categories of “public” information
(information in public view) are exempted from the consent requirements for col-
lection, use and disclosure, genuine data protection is lost. Austin cautions that
“control over personal information will only provide illusory privacy protection if
individuals are not given meaningful choices with respect to their information.”104
In United Food, the issue faced by the court was whether the consent rules in
PIPA — or the statute as a whole — should apply to information collected on a
picket line in the course of a labour dispute. The court found a public interest in
free expression in this context, and expressed concerns that data protection legisla-
tion might unduly limit the Union’s expressive activities. As a result, one of the
103 See Scassa, “Journalistic Purposes”, supra note 15.
104 Austin, supra note 28 at 25.
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issues in the case was whether the exemptions for publicly available information
should be expanded to capture information generally in public view.
It is important to note that expanding the scope of the publicly available infor-
mation exception is not the only — nor is it necessarily the best — way to ensure
that some personal information in public view can be collected, used or disclosed.
Currently, the structure of PIPEDA gives scope for the collection, use or disclosure
of personal information without consent in a range of contexts that depend not on
the nature of the source of the information, but rather on the purpose for which it is
being collected, used or disclosed. Thus, where information is being collected, used
or disclosed in the context of an investigation, for national security purposes, pur-
suant to a court order, or for journalistic purposes, for example, exceptions to the
consent rule already exist.105 If there is a specific context in which Parliament con-
siders that some personal information should be open to collection, use or disclo-
sure without consent, this context can be added to section 7 of PIPEDA, without
going so far as to create a new category of publicly available information. Thus, to
use the example of United Foods, if Parliament or a provincial legislature consid-
ered it important that information relating to picket line activity be capable of col-
lection, use or disclosure without consent, it could craft an exception to the rules of
consent to address that context.
The exception for publicly available information is carefully limited by law to
the collection, use and disclosure of personal information without consent only for
purposes for which such information is made public. While purposes can be more
or less ascertained with each of the current categories in the Regulations, it would
be difficult to tell what any individual’s purpose was in moving through public
space, or in posting information to a social networking site. The purpose of a
Facebook posting might be to share baby pictures with grandparents and other rela-
tives; it might be to gain friends or increase one’s status within one’s peer group; it
might be to promote one’s career or professional profile. A recent Canadian study
indicates that youth who post information on social networking sites conceive of
three separate networks for their information — friends, family and work. The
study suggests that these users of social networking sites expect these networks to
remain separate, and are concerned “about the risk that their personal information,
while quite freely shared and open to many within their network of friends, will end
up in the hands of others, such as their family and managers, who may not be
members of the same network.”106 Thus even when information is posted publicly,
the person posting the information may have a preconceived expectation of who the
public is for that information, and may have no intention of sharing that informa-
tion with others. A report by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada
indicates that “[y]oung adults are likely to post information that promotes the iden-
tity they want to project to the audience.”107 This makes determining the purpose
105 These are found in section 7 of PIPEDA, supra note 1.
106 Digital Divide, supra note 98 at 74. The recent report by the OPC on Online Tracking,
supra note 26 at 17, echoes this point when it discusses the “invisible audience” that
those who post information on social networks conceive of in making information
available.
107 Online Tracking, supra note 26 at 17.
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for which certain information is posted to social networking sites even more com-
plex. Including information posted online within the categories of “publicly availa-
ble information” would run counter to the expectations of many users of these sites,
and it would become unwieldy because it would be difficult to know the purpose
for which such information was provided.108 The same is true for information
about other general activities in public. Rather than expand the exception for pub-
licly available information, it makes more sense to identify those contexts (such as
picket line activity) that are judged to have sufficient public importance to warrant
a specific exception to the rule of consent.
It should be noted as well that the fact that individuals have posted informa-
tion to social networking sites or have carried out certain activities in public can
also be taken into account under the existing data protection legislation without
directly exempting this type of information from the rules of consent. The law al-
ready contemplates a kind of sliding scale for consent. Consent may be express or
implied, it may be obtained by opt in or opt out methods. The type of consent
required in any given case will depend on a range of circumstances. Key among
these is the sensitivity of the information. Where information is of a less sensitive
nature, the threshold for obtaining consent may be lower. It is certainly open to
courts and adjudicators to determine that information that an individual has chosen
to publish online in a relatively open context is of a less sensitive nature than other
information. This does not obviate the need for consent; and indeed it is only one of
the many contextual factors that must be taken into account. Such an approach,
however, does more to preserve the delicate balance struck in data protection legis-
lation than it does declaring open season on information individuals choose to share
with others in online fora or that relates to their activities in public.
Finally, the relationship between PIPEDA and its substantially similar provin-
cial counterparts must be kept in mind in considering reforms to PIPEDA or
changes to its substantially similar counterparts. It can be confusing and disruptive
to the smooth operation of commerce to have very different data protection norms
or thresholds from one province to another. There are no doubt many ways that the
statutes can be improved, reformed or amended that would not dramatically change
their scope or their core normative principles.109 However, a change to the regula-
tions governing publicly available information that would include social network-
ing sites or information revealed in public contexts would be significant, and would
lead to this information being treated very differently in one jurisdiction than it is in
another.
IV. CONCLUSION
Under the current structure of PIPEDA, consent is not required for the collec-
tion, use or disclosure of personal information that is “publicly available.” The
108 Research carried out for the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada indicates
that most users of social networking sites in the target study group posted information
primarily to share it with friends. (Decima Research, supra note 93 at 6).
109 For example, the manner in which PIPEDA is enforced, or the addition of a remedy for
a data security breach, could be added without changing the core normative provisions
of the legislation.
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Regulations Specifying Publicly Available Information contain a closed list of
sources of information that can be considered publicly available. The Regulations
are drafted narrowly, and it is also clear that the exception to the rule of consent for
“publicly available information” is available only where such information is col-
lected, used or disclosed for the purposes for which it was made publicly available,
or for purposes which a reasonable person would consider appropriate in the
circumstances.
In United Food, the Alberta Court of Appeal suggests that the publicly availa-
ble information exception may be unduly narrow because it does not capture infor-
mation in public view. Yet such an approach would gut not only the carefully
crafted and deliberately limited exception, it would eviscerate data protection law
more generally. Public information is still personal information, and in the data
protection context, the main objective is to provide individuals with some measure
of control over the use of their personal information by private sector organizations.
Currently it might be possible to argue that some information posted on social
networking sites or in other internet contexts by the data subject could fall within
one of the existing categories of publicly available information. For example, infor-
mation posted to a site such as LinkedIn might be argued to be information in a
professional or business directory. Information posted on blogs or on a site such as
Facebook might be argued to be a “publication.” However, there are good reasons
not to interpret these categories in the Regulations so broadly as to include all such
sources of personal information. It is not clear that all social networking sites are
genuinely “publicly available.”
Rather than opening individuals’ movements through public space (real or vir-
tual) to unrestricted data harvesting, a better approach would be to consider
whether the existing exceptions to consent set out in section 7 of PIPEDA are suffi-
cient to meet the legitimate needs of businesses, and to satisfy the public interest.
Currently these exceptions permit collection, use or disclosure of personal informa-
tion for a wide range of purposes including debt collection, emergency situations,
where there is a court order, or for investigations. If there is a specific context
which is lacking from the list, it would be preferable to address that context, rather
than to exempt an entire category of information from the fundamentally important
requirement of consent for its collection, use or disclosure. 
